Purpose: The aims of this study were to investigate how a variety of research methods is commonly employed to study technology and practitioner cognition. User-interface issues with infusion pumps were selected as a case because of its relevance to patient safety. Methods: Starting from a Cognitive Systems Engineering perspective, we developed an Impact Flow Diagram showing the relationship of computer technology, cognition, practitioner behavior, and system failure in the area of medical infusion devices. We subsequently conducted a systematic literature review on user-interface issues with infusion pumps, categorized the studies in terms of methods employed, and noted the usability problems found with particular methods. Next, we assigned usability problems and related methods to the levels in the Impact Flow Diagram. Results: Most study methods used to find user interface issues with infusion pumps focused on observable behavior rather than on how artifacts shape cognition and collaboration. A concerted and theorydriven application of these methods when testing infusion pumps is lacking in the literature. Detailed analysis of one case study provided an illustration of how to apply the Impact Flow Diagram, as well as how the scope of analysis may be broadened to include organizational and regulatory factors. Conclusion: Research methods to uncover use problems with technology may be used in many ways, with many different foci. We advocate the adoption of an Impact Flow Diagram perspective rather than merely focusing on usability issues in isolation. Truly advancing patient safety requires the systematic adoption of a systems perspective viewing people and technology as an ensemble, also in the design of medical device technology.
Introduction
Designing for the safe use of medical device technology is an overriding concern for medical device manufacturers, human factors engineers, practitioners, and regulatory bodies alike [1] . Frequently, the design activity takes the perspective of an artifact as an object rather than as a hypothesis about how the artifact shapes cognition and collaboration [2] . As pointed out by Woods [2] , standard human factors practice, driven by time and resource constraints, insulates the underlying concepts about how the system will support practitioners from results of usability testing of specific features and choices. In contrast, the Cognitive Systems Engineering contribution to design is not about the artifact as object, but about how the artifact is part of and transforms the distributed cognitive system.
One of the fundamental findings of Cognitive Science is that artifacts shape cognition and collaboration [3] . Technological artifacts impact cognition in context by representing work demands and underlying processes in particular ways. For instance, by showing only current status, some medical devices neither account for events that preceded the current state, nor indicate what to expect in the future [4] . This failure to develop representations that reveal change and highlight events in the monitored process has contributed to incidents where practitioners using such opaque representations miss operationally significant events due to impaired mental models [5] . Hence, there is a direct link from technological choices embodied in artifacts, to deficient cognitive processes in operational contexts, to incident evolution. This is one of the main reasons to go 'behind human error' [5] and develop a more extensive systemic analysis of incidents.
Cognitive Systems Engineering employs a wide variety of methods to study technology and practitioner cognition, ranging from ethnomethodology and conversational analysis, to cognitive work analysis and controlled studies [6] [7] [8] [9] . However, there have been few systematic studies to answer the question how one should study the interaction of complex tools, cognition, collaboration and context in the field setting or workplace, in terms of strengths and limitations of various methods. Woods [10] is an exception, even though he did not systematically compare strengths and limitations of various methods. Woods emphasized a family of methods he termed 'staged world studies' in which investigators stage situations of interest through simulations of some type. For instance, by introducing disruptions and contrasting conditions relative to the artefacts, the investigator may observe, by using process-tracing methods, how the distributed cognitive system responds. Our aim in this study was to map methods to the way artifacts shape cognition and collaboration. In particular, we developed an Impact Flow Diagram (adapted from [5] ) showing the relationship of computer technology, cognition, practitioner behavior, and system failure in the area of medical infusion devices. We subsequently conducted a systematic literature review on user-interface issues with infusion pumps, categorized the studies in terms of methods employed, and noted the usability problems found with particular methods. Next, we assigned usability problems and related methods to the levels in the Impact Flow Diagram.
As our approach is primarily descriptive and retrospective, our results will give an indication of the current practice of discovering user-interface issues with a particular medical device. By focusing on user-interface issues, we run the risk of limiting the field of view of our conceptual looking glasses, for instance by ignoring collaborative or organizational aspects. In order to limit the risk of this bias, we will devote a special paragraph to the larger context surrounding user-interface issues, and illustrate this with a selected case study from our literature review.
Medical infusion devices and use-related hazards
Infusion pumps are medical devices that deliver fluids into a patient's body in controlled amounts. Although infusion pumps have contributed to improvements in patient care, they are not without risks. For instance, from 2005 through 2009, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) received approximately 56,000 reports of adverse events associated with the use of infusion pumps, including numerous injuries and deaths [1] . In the UK, at least 700 unsafe incidents with infusion pumps are reported each year [11] . The FDA distinguishes between three types of reported problems: software defects, user interface issues, and mechanical or electrical failures [1] . This systematic review focuses on user interface issues.
That user-interface issues with infusion pumps are widely regarded as a serious issue, is reflected by the FDA's recent initiative to improve pump safety [1] . In order to assure that use-related hazards have been adequately controlled, the FDA [12] states that three central steps are essential:
1. Identify anticipated use-related hazards (derived analytically, for instance by heuristic analysis) and unanticipated userelated hazards (derived through formative evaluations, for instance simulated use testing). 2. Develop and apply strategies to mitigate or control use-related hazards. 3. Demonstrate safe and effective device use through human factors validation testing (either simulated use validation testing or clinical validation testing).
The analytical approaches and formative evaluations are complementary, each having unique strengths and weaknesses with respect to identifying, evaluating, and understanding use-related hazards early in the design process. Formative evaluations can demonstrate sufficient use-safety for an infusion pump. Formative evaluation has its strengths in a focus on critical tasks, challenging or unusual use scenarios and the follow-up to determine the cause of task failures. Potential limitations of formative evaluation include artificial testing conditions and limited range of users and use conditions. Clinical validation testing has its strengths in realistic testing conditions (e.g., time pressure, distractions, noise, glare), a broader range of users, and unanticipated use conditions, but potential limitations include lack of control over use scenarios and testing conditions.
Although the focus on use-related hazards is important, from a Cognitive Systems Engineering perspective one runs the risk of considering the artifact, in this case the infusion pump, as an object rather than as a hypothesis about how it shapes cognition and collaboration. In practice, this focus implies that specific features of the artifact are iteratively improved by usability testing while one remains blind to how more fundamental, frequently implicit, technological choices impact representations and cognitive processes. Just as the switch to the 'glass cockpit' in airplanes led to certain pilot actions becoming invisible to the co-pilot, the choice for computer technology in developing infusion pumps necessarily implied the implicit adoption and acceptance of certain generalizable characteristics of computer technology, such as the 'keyhole representations' of large data sets [5] . The implication for design methods is that the representations and cognitive processes should be at the core of one's attention, in addition to more traditional outcome measures. One family of methods are the process-tracing techniques, such as verbal protocols, and knowledge elicitation techniques (see [6] for a review). Ultimately, the purpose of these methods is to inform the design of systems for cognitive work from the point of view of people working in fields of practice.
As we expected process-tracing methods to be relatively unknown in the area of medical device technology, the primary aim of this study was to conduct a systematic review on the focus of methods commonly used in discovering user-interface issues with infusion pumps. The rationale for this review and focus is, first, that user-interface issues with infusion pumps have high relevance for patient safety, as human factors are commonly considered to be the leading cause of dosing errors [13] , frequently resulting from pump programming errors [14, 15] . Second, the case of infusion pumps is highly suitable as numerous studies have been carried out into user-interface issues with infusion pumps, thus providing a potentially large database to draw upon. The current review follows the PRISMA statement for systematic reviews to the extent permitted by the resulting extracted literature [16] .
Methods

Eligibility criteria
Literature was sought dealing with the user interface (or usability, human-machine, programming) of infusion pumps (or intravenous pump, infusion device, Patient-Controlled Analgesia [PCA] ). This particular focus does not lend itself easily to be formulated in a Population, Intervention, Comparison, Outcome, Study design (PICOS) question, as we did not want to restrict ourselves to a specific population and a specific intervention. By combining human factors or human-machine interface (HMI) issues on the one hand with the particular application area (infusion pumps) on the other hand, we expected to retrieve a manageable number of records. We restricted the reports retrieved to the years 1990-2011 and only included reports written in English.
Information sources
The search was conducted in the Scopus database, which includes PubMed and all relevant human factors journals. Date last searched was August 1, 2012.
Search
The search string used was:
(TITLE-ABS-KEY(''human factors'' OR ergonomics OR interface OR ''user-computer'' OR ''human-machine interaction'' OR usability OR hmi OR mmi OR programming)) AND (TITLE-ABS-KEY(''intravenous pump'' OR ''Patient-Controlled analgesia'' OR ''Patient controlled analgesia'' OR ''infusion pumps'' OR ''infusion pump'' OR ''intravenous pumps'' OR ''IV pump'' OR ''IV pumps'' OR ''infusion device'' OR ''infusion devices''))
Study selection
Screening of records was carried out by the first author based on full abstracts. Articles that evidently addressed only mechanical issues and/or technical issues with the delivery of fluids were excluded. Subsequently, the remaining full-text articles were assessed for eligibility. Articles that did not present empirical data, were insufficiently detailed (e.g., [33, 44] ) or highly deficient methodologically, review articles, or opinion articles (e.g., Letters to the Editor) were excluded in this step. Studies focusing on highly specific equipment problems [39, 43] , or specific procedures (e.g., handwritten versus computerized orders [27] ) were also excluded.
Data collection process
As this review was not a quantitative meta-analysis, a qualitative summary was written for each study included during data extraction. In accordance with PRISMA [16] , the following items were included in the summaries: sample size, sample characteristics (e.g., experience, clinical area), study period, study location (e.g., size and type of hospital), error-reporting database inspected, type of intervention (e.g., organizational, interface), tasks to be carried out, design issues (e.g., counterbalancing order, within-or between-subjects, repetitions), evaluation criteria, types of pumps used, measures (e.g., dosing errors, critical incidents, acceptance, mode errors, time taken to complete tasks, preference, workload). Due to the different nature of the studies retrieved, not all items were included in each summary.
Risk of bias in individual studies
Risk of bias at the study level was assessed by comparing several methodologically similar studies and noting differences, assessing these differences, and noting limitations of the studies as reported by the authors themselves. For instance, studies not controlling for order in which different interfaces are evaluated are subject to a higher risk of bias than studies in which order is counterbalanced. Risk of bias at the outcome level was assessed by recording whether outcome measures were based on self-reports, expert judgments, observation of user behavior, or actual readouts from pump databases. For instance, studies that heavily rely on self-reports in error databases are more prone to bias at the outcome level than studies that directly observe programming errors.
Risk of bias across studies
Chan et al. [17] reported that incomplete outcome reporting is common in randomized trials. Overall, 50% of efficacy and 65% of harm outcomes were incompletely reported (e.g., precise p-values or effect sizes were not reported). Whether this should be called a 'bias' or a reporting convention is a matter of debate. Furthermore, the demands put upon the researchers in reporting outcomes in terms of levels of statistical detail are subject to change over time. Given that we included studies from 1990 onwards, substantial differences in outcome reporting may be expected. Given, also, that our focus in this review was not on comparing exact outcomes across studies, but rather on the different methodologies used, we decided not to focus on incomplete outcome reporting. Fig. 1 shows the flow of information through the different phases of the systematic review:
Results and discussion
Study selection
The study selection process (see Fig. 1 ) shows that no duplicates were removed. In some cases, notably the work by Garmer et al. [18] , Lin et al. [19, 20] , Obradovich and Woods [21] , and Wetterneck et al. [22] , the same research was presented first at a conference and was later published in a journal. We decided to retain all versions, as slightly different aspects were emphasized in each version. If one were to consider these studies as duplicates, five records would be removed.
Categorization of studies
The 47 studies included in the final analysis differed widely in terms of methodology used. We decided to categorize the studies in the following categories: experimental comparison (N = 8), heuristic evaluations of existing pumps (N = 4), medical device evaluation in hospital procurement (N = 4), observational studies (N = 9), pre-post intervention studies (N = 9), retrospective analyses (N = 6), and case studies (N = 7).
This categorization scheme was informed by established methodological sources such as Shadish, Cook, and Campbell [51] . However, in order to better capture the richness involved in the various studies, we decided to subcategorize studies further. For instance, the categories ''Heuristic evaluations of existing pumps'' and ''Medical device evaluation in hospital procurement'' should theoretically be placed under the main category of ''Observational studies''. Yet, this would have neglected large methodological differences among these studies as well as potential interesting outcome differences. The final resulting categorization scheme is therefore not so much theoretically valid as well as heuristically valid for this particular domain of research (user interface issues with infusion pumps). Eventually, all 47 studies could be uniquely assigned to one category (when a particular study consisted of more than one methodological approach, the dominant approach was chosen for classification).
In Table 1 , the 47 studies are grouped according to study type, and further subdivided into study methods, variables, findings, and methodological limitations. Section 3.3 will relate the study findings to the Impact Flow Diagram, whereas Section 3.4 will map the methods to the Impact Flow Diagram. Section 3.5 will discuss the relative strengths and weaknesses of the methods, based on limitations noted by the authors themselves, and informed by considerations from methodological sources such as [51] . Section 3.6 will describe a case study expanding the analysis to include coordination and organizational aspects. Table 1 shows a highly diverse list of findings. In order to structure these findings, we first focused on usability issues, our first topic of interest in this review. Second, we made the relationships explicit between the properties of the infusion pump as a medium, the way infusion pumps represent the underlying process for practitioners, and how these representations impact the cognitive and collaborative behavior of practitioners. These relationships are depicted in Fig. 2 , in the form of an Impact Flow Diagram [5] . In the following discussion, we will draw upon individual studies to illustrate our general points. Fig. 2 depicts how infusion pump technology is an instance of computer technology in general, and that there are design shaping properties of the computer medium that make it easy for designers Fig. 1 . Selection process used by the authors to identify appropriate published studies about userinterface issues with infusion pumps. On the basis of the number of heuristics violated, the average severity rating, and the affordance violations, one particular pump received the highest recommendation
Impact Flow Diagram
Method is entirely dependent on the information that the manufacturer provides (continued on next page) , it was set at 0.5 mg mL
À1
. This setting resulted in the administered dose being ten times greater than the prescribed dose (in this case, 20 mg boluses instead of Retrospective event reconstruction is vulnerable to outcome bias and hindsight bias, particularly in the absence of adequate critical incident reporting (continued on next page) to create devices with typical flaws in human-computer operation. For instance, the general property of 'virtuality' means that there is nothing inherent in the computer medium that constrains the relationship between things represented and their representation. What needs to be represented is the larger therapy plan or dosetime relationships [45] . However, contemporary infusion device displays are limited to showing only current status, and offer no evidence of context that drove changes to infusion rate, nor of future implications of infusion rate changes [4, 46] . The infusion device has the capability to 'make us smart' [3] , yet it 'makes us dumb', as it does not answer the questions in the mind of a clinician.
Further, the 'keyhole' property of the computer medium, shared by infusion devices, means that the size of the available display units is very small relative to the size of the number of data displays that potentially could be examined. This particular property leads to some typical representational properties of the design, such as deep hierarchical levels with a vast number of programming pathways [42] , complex and arbitrary sequences of operation [45] , and different operating modes intended for different contexts [45] . In turn, these representational properties shape the cognitive systems involved and lead to increased memory demands and impair the development of accurate mental models of the pump, as demonstrated by Nunnally et al.'s [42] failure to find a relationship between level of experience and ability to use the pump. In the end, these cognitive systems have inevitable behavior shaping properties and their impact on operational processes is shown as programming errors [15, 57, 58, 68] or 'mode errors' [40, 45] .
Finally, the general property of interactivity means that computer technology should make pertinent aspects of its status and intentions obvious, should enable a collaborative approach, and participate in managing attention to the most important signals without overwhelming the user with low-level messages. When not done properly, ambiguous alarms [45, 53] and poor feedback on device state and behavior result [45] . Poor feedback and ambiguous alarms shape cognition by complicating situation assessment and enhancing stress on workload management. These properties of cognitive systems shape resultant practitioner behavior, in that alerts are frequently overridden [64, 65] , drug libraries are bypassed [59] in order to reduce stress on workload, and infusion is inadvertently stopped [66, 69, 70] because of poor feedback on system status.
In conclusion, the findings present a pattern that is representative for the generally unreflective use of computer technology by designers. The design shaping properties of the computer medium (e.g., virtuality, keyhole effect) stimulate designers to create devices with typical flaws in human-computer cooperation. In the case of infusion devices, typical flaws such as proliferating modes, making the system opaque, and providing poor feedback, create new cognitive demands, such as increased memory demands, impaired mental models, and poor situation assessment. These design deficiencies become problems that possibly contribute to incidents if other factors are present, such as distraction or increase in workload [70] . Although the Impact Flow Diagram may give the impression that the cognition-shaping properties of representations only affect individual caregivers, unreflective use of technology is in fact about miscoordination between the human and machine portion of a single ensemble, with the human portion frequently being distributed across multiple caregivers. Coordination across caregivers is an aspect that has not received sufficient attention in the literature reviewed here, although there are some hints of its importance [21, 70] . In paragraph 3.6, we will re-analyze Syed et al.'s case study [70] , by paying special attention to coordination and organizational aspects.
Mapping methods to the Impact Flow Diagram
The findings reported in Table 1 , with the associated study type and study methods, were coded for presence of key words listed at the right-hand side of the Impact Flow Diagram (Fig. 2) . Next, the associated methods were assigned independently by the two authors to one of the four levels in the Impact Flow Diagram (i.e., Computer Technology; Computer Based Devices; Joint Cognitive Systems; Infusion Pump Technology). A Cohen's unweighted Kappa of .75 showed good agreement between the two coders. Remaining discrepancies were resolved by discussion. This yielded the following mapping (see Table 2 ):
The results of the mapping process show a number of interesting points. First, the majority of the study methods employed in previous studies uncovering user interface issues with infusion pumps deal with the impact of behavior shaping properties of cognitive systems on operational processes, that is, use errors. Second, none of the methods employed dealt with general properties of computer technology. Apparently, these properties are not the direct focus of most study methods. Third, not surprisingly, the observational studies on use problems excel at determining the impact of the general properties of computer technology on the representational properties of the design. This is not surprising given that these observational studies, in particular [21, 42, 45] , were carried out within a Cognitive Systems Engineering framework that formed the basis for the Impact Flow Diagram. Fourth, the impact of the cognition shaping properties of representations on [71] Case study Qualitative event reconstruction
Chronology of events
The manufacturer initially exhibited the traditional approach to medical error for years, with an emphasis on better nurse training. This long period was followed by a comparatively abrupt shift toward human factors design. The shift was preceded by a 9-month period characterized by new leadership, a perception of poor organizational performance, and a disruption of the operating environment (e.g. pressures from government and public opinion)
Event reconstruction was not based on internal company documents. No valid method available for weighing the relative influence of events on cultural change cognitive systems were dealt with only by case studies. Still, issues such as increased memory demands, complicated situation assessment and inaccurate mental models of pump design are being dealt with only sparingly in the studies retrieved. Finally, although the mapping process yielded some ambiguity regarding heuristic evaluations, inspection of the full list of heuristics in the primary sources, e.g., [29] , made it clear that these heuristics focus primarily on representations.
In conclusion, covering all levels in the Impact Flow Diagram requires a combination of methods, in particular observational studies, case studies, heuristic analysis and experimental comparisons. Even then, these methods by themselves do not deal with general properties of computer technology.
Strengths and limitations of methods
Strengths and limitations of methods were derived from the limitations noted by authors themselves (listed in Table 1 ), in conjunction with general methodological sources such as [51] . The case studies (1), the heuristic evaluations (2) , and the observational studies (3) excel at finding usability issues, ranging from quite specific in some case studies to more general in some observational studies. These usability issues are being dealt with in attempts to design new and improved interfaces for infusion pumps. Comparing these new interfaces with existing interfaces is a relative strength of experimental comparisons (4). These comparisons yield precise and quantitative data on the speed and accuracy with which programming tasks are carried out. Together, these four methods yield information on usability issues that stays closest to the user interface. When used together in a sensible way, for instance in a mixed-methods study, the methodological limitations of these methods may be mitigated as they are complementary in some cases. It should be noted that some observational studies on use problems ( [21, 42, 45] ) and some experimental comparison studies ( [19, 20] ) provided a wealth of information on mental representations and cognitive processes that went beyond observable behaviors. For instance, Lin et al. [19, 20] carried out an extensive cognitive task analysis that served as a foundation for their newly developed interface design.
The other methods, retrospective analysis (5) and pre-post intervention (6) , although broadening the scope of issues that may go wrong during the infusion process, suffer from a number of limitations. Retrospective analysis of medication error records is highly dependent on the quality of error-reporting, in particular the accuracy and completeness of the reports. Due to the fact that the researcher using these reports is dependent upon a third party for providing these reports, there is ultimately no control over data collection procedures and, hence, quality of data outcome. Retrospective analysis may give a very broad indication of the incidence of PCA-related errors, relative to other types of errors, its effects on patient harm, and its occurrence during particular phases of the medication-use process. However, in comparison with other methods, this method does not yield detailed insights into usability issues, and may be subject to numerous biases, such as the outcome bias [72, 73] and the hindsight bias [74] . And, like all retrospective methods, it may prematurely attribute failure to ''human error'', it may overly simplify the dilemmas and difficulties practitioners face, and may not explain failure at all, but merely represents a primary reaction to failure [5] . Pre-post intervention is quite different in this respect, as it observes reductions in medication errors after a particular suite of interventions has been introduced. These interventions frequently go beyond relatively isolated changes in interface design, but rather involve training programs, changes in work procedures, and the introduction of smart pumps. Frequently lacking a control group and introducing multiple intervention measures simultaneously, these methods do not allow one to draw inferences about causality (see [51] ).
Finally, medical device evaluation in hospital procurement (7) constitutes a retrospective reflection on the usefulness of various methods employed during the acquisition of new medical devices. It has yielded interesting issues to take into account during a procurement process. In particular, as already noted by Woods [2] , there may be a tendency, due to time and resource constraints, to narrowly focus on user preferences rather than user behavior, and to equate safety with technical accuracy rather than usability. Underlying concepts about how the system will support practitioners are hardly ever being dealt with during hospital procurement processes.
In conclusion, from the perspective of design of cognitive work from the point of view of people working in fields of practice, there is a scarcity of methods that focus on tracing cognitive processes. Combining several methods (in particular, observational studies, heuristic analysis, and experimental comparison) may yield a broader picture, but only when the focus when using these methods is on uncovering representations and cognitive processes. There is nothing inherent in the methods themselves that prevent a researcher from narrowly focusing on observable behavior alone, nor in focusing on individual determinants alone. The next paragraph illustrates how to go beyond individual determinants, as well as providing an illustration of applying the Impact Flow Diagram in a case study.
3.6. Case study: how medical device technology and organizational policy shape cognition and collaboration
In order to prevent a narrow focus on individual cognition shaping properties to the exclusion of collaboration shaping properties, we will discuss a particular case study, [70] , in somewhat more detail. It should be mentioned that this particular case study was not carried out from a Cognitive Systems Engineering perspective. However, since it used some typical Cognitive Systems Engineering methods (e.g., qualitative event reconstruction using interviews), it may be reinterpreted in terms of our Impact Flow Diagram.
In a hospital setting, morphine concentration was incorrectly programmed in a PCA infuser by two nurses: instead of 5 mg mL À1 , it was set at 0.5 mg mL
À1
. The concentration programming error with this pump has been reported previously [58] and results from a low default setting as the initial choice. The most common programming error is to enter the default concentration. This setting resulted in the administered dose being ten times greater than the prescribed dose (in this case, 20 mg boluses instead of 2 mg). Because the PCA was incorrectly attached to the patient, the patient initially did not receive morphine. The incorrect concentration setting was discovered by a third nurse and the pump was reprogrammed by the second nurse. Still, the patient reported back pain. A fourth nurse later in the afternoon discovered the incorrect attachment and corrected the position of the back check valve. Shortly after this, the anesthesiologist visited the patient during routine pain rounds and found her to be cyanosed, somnolent and apneic. The patient made a full recovery after resuscitative measures were taken. The pump was replaced by more up to date technology. Neither of the two nurses involved in the initial programming of the pump was familiar with the programming.
Compounding the programming error was the misplacement of the back-check valve, which allowed a large reservoir of morphine to accumulate, most likely in the empty antibiotic bag, which was piggybacked into the main iv line earlier in the day. Nurses were not alerted to potential problems with the system, even after 153 mg of morphine had been delivered from the pump over a period of 90 min and the patient was still complaining of pain. The third nurse suspected a programming error and alerted the second nurse, who reprogrammed the pump to its desired setting. The fourth nurse later recognized that the back check valve was incorrectly attached; however, she assumed that the antibiotic bag contained cefazolin instead of the accumulated morphine. When she flushed the iv line and allowed its contents to be administered, a massive dose of morphine was delivered. The patient's rapid change in level of pain and the onset of drowsiness were taken for an appropriate response to morphine. According to the authors of this case study, multiple caregivers, insufficient handover, incorrect assumptions, and distributed knowledge contributed to the adverse event.
In terms of our Impact Flow Diagram, it is clear that the programming error resulted from the general property of virtuality (freedom from physical constraints), which enabled the pump to return to a low default setting as the initial choice. This, combined with poor feedback on device state and behavior led to an inaccurate mental model of the pump behavior, which resulted in a programming error. In addition to this programming error, there also was an incorrect attachment of the PCA tubing to the patient. This has nothing to do with computer technology, but it represents a design flaw in that there was no 'forcing function' [3] to constrain the sequence of user actions: nurses could misplace the back-check valve without feedback that the morphine would accumulate in an empty antibiotic bag. The impact on the nurses' cognitive system was again that an inaccurate mental model was developed, this time of the joint patient-pump relationship. The impact on operational processes was to inadvertently cease infusion, as the patient did not receive any morphine while it was being redirected to the antibiotic bag.
It is important to think of people and technology, not as independent components, but rather as a single ensemble where breakdowns in coordination may occur [5] . The Joint Cognitive Systems in the Impact Flow Diagram are clearly apparent in this case, as there were four different nurses involved over a time span of a little over five hours, an anesthesiologist, the postanesthesia care It is also important to emphasize that the patient herself is part of the system to be monitored and controlled by the hospital staff. The fact that the patient for a long time had no complaints other than that she still experienced pain, was correctly explained, first as a programming error, and later as due to an incorrect attachment. Unfortunately, these explanations were limited, partially correct, and symptom-oriented. Her symptoms of drowsiness once the morphine was delivered in a massive dose were quite understandably normalized as representing a to-be-expected reaction to the morphine taking effect. Different nurses taking care of the same patient for brief periods of time leads to the equivalent of the 'keyhole effect' in computer technology: the nurses merely get a glimpse of a more dynamic and continuous process to which the patient herself and her daughter had more privileged access (it is noteworthy that it was the daughter who reported that her mother was ''feeling weird'' after the massive injection of morphine). Poor feedback on the patient's state and behavior then again led to an inaccurate mental model of her state on the part of the nurses. This inaccurate model was only corrected by the anesthesiologist when the patient's symptoms were so clear that they could not be ignored any more. The fact that the staff anesthesiologist visited the patient during routine pain rounds just after she had received the massive injection of morphine again emphasizes the importance of the 'keyhole effect', this time with a fortunate ending (one wonders what would have happened if the anesthesiologist was held up on his way to the patient).
This case study, using methods such as interviews, chart review and inspection of historical pump data, went a long way in uncovering the sequence of events leading up to the incident. The authors adopted the 'latent failure model' [75] in that they considered the various nurses involved as layers of defense, with the accident progression being stopped by the anesthesiologist who happened to be at the right time at the right place. Although this example clearly indicates the importance of inadequate communications, deficient training, design failures, and unsuitable materials, in the end it fails to adopt systems thinking, because it views 'human error' as the only explanatory construct (the authors list 17 potential human errors associated with PCA opioid administration, of which they claim 6 were present in the current incident). Putting on different conceptual glasses, we have tried to maintain a systems perspective, albeit a limited one within the scope of this paper, by showing how the Impact Flow Diagram may be helpful in analyzing this case. In particular, organizational policies and regulations enforce multiple caregivers to obtain piecemeal information and impede collaboration. This organizational 'keyhole effect', combined with poor feedback on the patient's state, led to only partially correct mental models on the part of the nurses. Note that this explanation goes beyond the traditional human factors explanation of accidents in terms of ''loss of situation awareness'' and does not blame the nurses in any way [76] .
Conclusions, limitations, and recommendations
Conclusions
Our systematic literature review has shown that most study methods used to find user interface issues with infusion pumps focus on observable behavior rather than on how artifacts shape cognition and collaboration. In terms of the Impact Flow Diagram developed, most methods deals with operational processes rather than with representational properties of design or with joint cognitive systems. This is unfortunate, as it limits our deeper understanding of the multiple constraints involved in this domain. Detailed analysis of one case study showed that a deeper understanding is limited not so much by the methods employed but by the conceptual looking glasses that were put on, in other words, by the, frequently implicit, model of accident causation adopted.
Our results also clearly show that, although several techniques for usability evaluation testing exist in isolation, the concerted application of these techniques when testing infusion pumps is lacking in the literature. There are some advancements reported in the hospital procurement process where human factors engineering has been taken into account from the outset [35] . Even though this process may include multiple forms of usability testing and evaluation, it is still subject to issues such as underrepresentation of stakeholders, vagueness of criteria by which pumps are judged, confirmation bias, and time pressure. There are still a lot of lessons to be learned from detailed descriptions of procurement processes, yet incorporating human factors principles in hospital procurement decision-making is, in the long run, essential to identifying pumps that are difficult to use and that pose potential dangers to patient safety.
Our study showed the importance of going beyond the simple application of methods to solve particular user-interface problems. One way of 'going beyond' is the adoption of a theoretical perspective such as the Cognitive Systems Engineering perspective with the associated Impact Flow Diagram. Assuming that a broad coverage of all levels within the Impact Flow Diagram is desirable, we would recommend combining heuristic analysis, observational studies of use problems and experimental comparisons, as these are the methods that were found to yield the broadest range of issues while at the same time suffering from the fewest methodological problems, if applied sensibly, that is, with a clear view toward describing the cognitive processes and representations from a practitioner's point of view.
Limitations
Taken as a whole, the 47 studies retrieved differed widely in methodology. We therefore grouped them in seven categories. Of course, this impeded a quantitative meta-analysis, and, due to lack of detail on statistical measures, it turned out to be impossible to perform a quantitative synthesis.
Limitations at the review level may have been the incomplete retrieval of identified research. However, out of the 232 records identified in total, only 5 (2.1%) were identified through other sources than database searching [30, 38, 41, 48, 56] . This does not necessarily imply that we identified all studies, but the percentage identified through other sources is small enough to be confident that not many studies were missed.
Recommendations
Every piece of medical device technology is part of and shapes the human-technology ensemble. Designing for the safe use of medical technology requires us to recognize this fact. Narrowly focusing on the improvement of the technology part is bound to overlook the broader implications of the design process. Research methods to uncover use problems with technology may be used in many ways, with many different foci. Our research has shown that most methods employed in uncovering user-interface problems focus on observable behavior, to the relative neglect of the shaping forces of computer technology on representations and processes. We advocate the adoption of an Impact Flow Diagram perspective rather than merely focusing on usability issues in isolation. Truly advancing patient safety requires the systematic adoption of a systems perspective, also in the design of medical device technology.
